Skip to content
ARTEX.sh

ARTEX ConnectWise attack:Storm-0940, Microsoft, Wiz and Google GTIG.

In October 2026 Microsoft said a China-state aligned actor, Storm-0940, used ARTEX to speed up a supply chain compromise of ConnectWise's Cloud Backup application and to try sign-ins at more than 2,250 downstream tenants. Wiz and Google's threat intelligence group (GTIG) published related findings.

When
From September 2026; Microsoft post 2026-10-21
Reported by
Microsoft Threat Intelligence, ConnectWise, Wiz, Google GTIG
Scope
ConnectWise Cloud Backup; 2,250+ tenants targeted (attempts, not confirmed breaches)
ARTEX role
Automated scanning, password spraying and OAuth app abuse, per Microsoft

What happened

Microsoft says Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor active since 2021, used ARTEX from as early as September 2026 against hundreds of organizations in many industries. Several attacks reached privileged cloud access, with multiple cases under three hours from first targeting to privileged access.

Between 2026-10-10 and 2026-10-14, Microsoft saw an automated password spray against 327 accounts at eight organizations: 151,000+ failed logons, peaking at 2,900 failures a minute on October 11. It saw no successful authentication in that campaign. On October 15 public reports of the ConnectWise compromise appeared with indicators in the same network range, and ConnectWise published its first advisory on October 16. Infosecurity Magazine adds that ConnectWise first saw suspicious activity on October 15, found unauthorized access to Cloud Backup application identities on October 17, and took Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick), SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline.

After taking control of ConnectWise cloud application identities, the actor's agents signed in to customer tenants through apps those tenants had already authorized. Microsoft found follow-on activity through Microsoft Graph in several environments: reconnaissance, changes to application credentials and attempts to change privileges. Microsoft says none of this came from a flaw in its own products, and that an affected app or a successful sign-in does not by itself mean data was accessed.

How ARTEX was involved

Microsoft describes ARTEX as an open-source, multi-agent LLM framework written in Go with a Next.js front end that can run a test from reconnaissance through data exfiltration. In the ConnectWise case it says Storm-0940 used ARTEX to accelerate scanning, reconnaissance, password spraying and OAuth application abuse at downstream victims.

Wiz reported that an actor overlapping Storm-0940 used ARTEX-associated tooling against IT and software vendors throughout October, focused on Okta, Microsoft Entra ID and AWS Cognito. Google's GTIG tracks a campaign it calls UNC7228 that overlaps Storm-0940, with activity back to at least August 2026. It says the actor typically moved from a first compromised account to deep access in about four hours, and in one case in 15 minutes.

Confirmed and alleged

Reported as observed

  • ConnectWise took Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline after unauthorized access to Cloud Backup application identities (Infosecurity Magazine).
  • Microsoft recorded 151,000+ failed logons in the October 10 to 14 spray, and follow-on Graph activity in several customer environments.
  • The 2,250+ figure counts tenants where sign-ins were attempted. Microsoft clarified that it means attempted access, not confirmed breaches (Republic World, citing Microsoft).

Alleged, assessed or unclear

  • The attribution to Storm-0940 and to China-state alignment is Microsoft's assessment. Microsoft says it assesses Storm-0940 was responsible for the ConnectWise compromise.
  • GTIG's UNC7228 overlaps Storm-0940. Overlap is not the same as identity, and the two vendors name actors differently.
  • Whether data was taken in any given tenant. Sign-in counts do not show that.

Takeaways for defenders

Drawn from what the sources themselves recommend or observed. Not a complete checklist.

  • Microsoft: keep affected ConnectWise application connections disabled until ConnectWise gives formal restoration instructions, and preserve evidence before deleting enterprise applications.
  • Search by application ID, not display name, and review service principal sign-ins from at least 2026-10-15 (October 1 where records allow).
  • Review Entra audit records for credential additions, new service principals or owners, app role assignments, consent grants and privileged role assignments.
  • Apply least privilege to multi-tenant application permissions, and watch for credential additions and unusual app-only activity.
  • Google GTIG lists long-standing practices as the answer to machine-speed attacks: control-plane isolation, short-lived credentials, least privilege, segmentation and behavioral detection.

Sources

Every claim above comes from these pages or from this site's news data. Open them for the full reports.

Follow the ARTEX story.

New forks, releases and reports, dated and sourced.

Isometric plane with glowing light columns