ARTEX backdoored Docker image:a look-alike copy with a hidden root back door.
After the original repository came down on 2026-10-08, a look-alike copy of ARTEX pointed installs at a prebuilt Docker image that researchers say contained a hidden back door. Docker removed the images on 2026-11-05. This page follows BadByte, StepSecurity and Blackfish Security.
- When
- Pushed 2026-10-08; removed by Docker 2026-11-05
- Reported by
- BadByte (2026-11-04), StepSecurity (2026-11-12), Blackfish Security (2026-11-14)
- Scope
- tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex on Docker Hub
- ARTEX role
- A trojanized copy, not ARTEX as the developer shipped it
What happened
StepSecurity and BadByte report that on the evening of 2026-10-08, hours after the developer's closed-source notice, a new Docker Hub account called tomicdd pushed an ARTEX image. BadByte gives the push as 19:41 UTC. Less than an hour later a GitHub account uploaded a copy of the source with one line changed, so that the Docker Compose file pulled tomicdd/artex instead of the official image. Its README called the copy the maintained successor.
The source code in that repository matched the original, so a code review would find nothing. StepSecurity says the back door lived only in the prebuilt image. A second image, congdonglinux/artex, carried the same build. Docker removed both on 2026-11-05.
Counts depend on the day. BadByte reported 7,913 pulls of tomicdd/artex and 33 of the second image by 2026-11-03, and 9,131 and 45 at its final count. Blackfish cited 8,817+ pulls when it published its analysis. BadByte counted 62 internet-facing consoles serving the backdoored build between 2026-11-02 and 2026-11-04. StepSecurity adds that 637 GitHub repositories still pointed Compose files at the image.
How ARTEX was involved
This is not behavior the developer shipped. It is a change added to a prebuilt image. In StepSecurity's words, an extra function runs any command sent in the login form, as root, before ARTEX checks the password. BadByte says the implant never calls home and waits for a request, and that updating the image does not remove the compromise.
Blackfish Security says its static analysis, which did not run the sample, found exactly one injected function when it compared the binary with the source. Those Blackfish claims have not been independently checked. This site's fork data records that the trhhubsd/ARTEX mirror pointed its compose file at the image and was deleted around 2026-11-04, and that failsafe-security/artex published a localhost-bound source build afterwards.
Confirmed and alleged
Reported as observed
- Docker removed tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex on 2026-11-05 (BadByte, StepSecurity).
- The look-alike repository's source matched upstream. The difference was in the prebuilt image (StepSecurity).
- BadByte found 62 internet-facing consoles serving the backdoored build in its 2026-11-02 to 11-04 window.
Alleged, assessed or unclear
- Who ran the Docker account and the look-alike repository. The sources we read do not say.
- Blackfish's disassembly claims come from static analysis only and are not independently checked.
- How many backdoored consoles exist. BadByte calls 62 a floor and estimates about 590 more live consoles run an unversioned build of the same source that may or may not be trojanized.
Takeaways for defenders
Drawn from what the sources themselves recommend or observed. Not a complete checklist.
- Check which copy and which Docker image your team installed. An install from tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex, or from a Compose file pointing to either, has a back door that gives anyone root on the host (StepSecurity).
- Rebuild the host and rotate every AI provider key and credential stored in the console (StepSecurity). BadByte lists the database password, LLM and search API keys, webhook and bot tokens, SMTP and proxy credentials and the session signing key.
- Do not expose the console port 8787 to the internet. StepSecurity notes the supplied Compose file opens port 8787 on every network interface.
- SHA-256 of the backdoored /app/artex program, per BadByte and Blackfish: d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573.
Sources
Every claim above comes from these pages or from this site's news data. Open them for the full reports.
- ARTEX backdoor Docker image
BadByte, 2026-11-04
- ARTEX: Attackers Adopted This AI Pentesting Tool in Three Months. Leaked Secrets Are Its Fastest Way In.
StepSecurity, 2026-11-12
- ARTEX Forensics: backdoored Docker image and the deleted authorization guard
GitHub (darkfibr, Blackfish Security), 2026-11-14
Related pages
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